The Honor Was Mine: A Look Inside the Struggles of Military Veterans by Elizabeth Heaney: Book Review

The Honor Was Mine: A Look Inside the Struggles of Military Veterans by Elizabeth Heaney
My rating: 5 of 5 stars

This is the story of a civilian counselor who joined a program to provide off-the-record counseling services at domestic military bases. She spent short term assignments at each base, with the intention that it was part of a portfolio of provided services, attracting members of the military community who would not be willing to engage the more traditional mental health resources that were already available. It is a view of the military that I very much relate to, as I was attached to a deployed unit as a civilian for a similar period of time.

The first chapter starts slow, she talks about the trauma in her life prior to her taking this assignment as a way of resetting her life (and this gets dropped in the rest of the book). But once you get past the first chapter you get into the story. Two themes that permeate are her being a civilian learning her way around the military environment, which sets up the theme of veterans returning from deployment and those around them responding in their different ways.

The first theme is that of a civilian entering the military community and the differences. She tells the story of her first assignment, of encountering military discipline and curtsy first as a shock, but then respect for the stability that it provides. She goes on to what she realizes the purpose of many of attitudes and rhythms of the military. First, the realization that those in the military must be prepared for anything at any time, and military discipline and curtsy is intended to build the attitudes needed to enable that. Second, that there are a range of overall attitudes held by those in the military, with a considerable more diversity than she expected when she was in a civilian life. But one set of values that holds people together is a focus on duty (towards country and each other, not necessarily in that order) and integrity. And the dissonances between those values and what they see in the civilian world (and in what I called Big Army for that matter) causes many of the problems they have in adapting to home.

But what this long discussion of the difficulties she had in getting used to the military culture does is leads to her discussion about the issues that veterans and their families and the problems that veterans who have returned from a combat zone and their families. And she has gone through the same type of struggle in the first chapter with what she dealt with in her life and the reactions of those around her, and dealing with the same culture shift in the other direction. This part is the deepest, she alternates between telling the stories of the people she meets during the course of her assignments and the story of her processing these. Stories of working with the returning soldiers, the transition between combat and their families, soldiers and spouses trying to deal with the uncertainty of life in general and of soldiers returning after a year of combat, spouses worried about infidelity when the returning soldier is still working through the transition between combat and peacetime, of the care that soldiers have of the wounded and fallen brothers (and sisters) in arms.

Through it all, what shows through is her thankfulness that she has seen this part of life, the pride, dedication, and duty to others that permeates the military. And the recognition that this is not the norm in U.S. society at large. In my own experience, I've been told to view the lives of companions as not precious, had offers to refer me to counselors who would tell me that I should have ignored the calls for help from someone in the backcountry. And this contrasting incredibly with being deployed to a combat zone where I was with people who did their duty and tried to do right by those that they were along side. And when I returned, my then girlfriend and I spent a month trying to figure out if I had changed. (and when we were all settled, I figured that I had a good thing going and proposed to her!)

It is a wonderful book. It has a great treatment of PTSD, because it takes the first step of having to experience some of the causes (the need to be constantly aware, the sense that your world and your attitude may have to shift in a heartbeat, and you have to be ready for it, and having to deal with a civilian world that does not generally value duty or integrity) It does not preach, but it gives a set of eyes that had to go through similar experiences and uses that as an analogy into that world.

Note: I received a free electronic copy of this through the Goodreads Giveaways program. The opinions are my own and were not subject to any review.

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Stryker: The Seige of Sadr City by Konrad Ludwig

Stryker: The Siege of Sadr City by Konrad R.K. Ludwig
My rating: 4 of 5 stars

Ludwig gives the story of the Siege of Sadr City as he saw it, as an infantry part of the 2nd Cavalry. And as in all stories that do this right, he does not start with the battle itself, but with how the elements were prepared to be sent into battle, so this book is a story of how a U.S. infantryman is trained, then equipped, then prepared for battle.

The first parts of the book could be subtitled as the making of an infantryman. Ludwig writes of his state of mind in choosing infantry as a branch when his recruiter told him that he had options. He focuses on his desire to challenge himself, and demonstrate that he could meet all challenges. And the disappointment he had when after finishing school he gets sent to a unit that was not deploying into combat anytime soon. The goal here is to explain the aggressiveness of infantry, why it is needed, and how it is distilled. We also get the source of their pride. It is not just the aggressiveness, it is also the excessive attention to detail required even under stress that is developed in training and emphasized and honed when infantrymen arrive at their units and are further trained by the NCO masters of their craft.

The second part was his unit deploying to Iraq, as part of the 2007 surge. I remember this period as the time I was preparing for deployment and my actual deployment into Afghanistan. And I also remember at this time we laughed at people who said that we (the U.S.) were doing well or even that we really had a handle on what kind of wars we were in. Ludwig's stories here are of what that confusion looked like on the ground. Of soldiers in combat who completed the tasks assigned to them, whether they be kinetic combat or direct interaction with Iraqi civilians or training Iraqi security forces, but those of us who were trying to direct them were still feeling our way through. And then there were those who liked to think they actually understood what they were doing, which made things harder on those who were in direct contact with reality like Ludwig. We see the conflict that he had of being highly trained, focused instrument, but with those who were directing that instrument blind and not willing to admit it, and the combat troops were the ones who paid the consequence, physically and mentally. And this was up against Iraqi militants who were the ones who had survived three years of battle with U.S. forces, and they had no trouble with recognizing reality. It was an environment that U.S. soldiers entering for the first time had to grow up in a hurry. And they did.

The third was the actual battle of Sadr City. Here we see both the situation in contact, the overall situation, and the situation as seen by the platoon and squad level (Ludwig's understanding is probably informed by the time he spent in the tactical operations center). Ludwig shows the effects of some policies that we put into place by people who were removed from the reality of contact with either the Iraqi people or the militants we were in combat with. But he also shows how some leaders could adapt when confronted with reality. What makes this part shine is how you can see the battle changing character as both sides are adapting and responding to each others actions. The U.S. utilizing their training and resources, the Iraqi militants using the lessons learned by the survivors of years of combat. This part is probably more interesting because I've read some reports that were from the viewpoint at the company and battalion level. And I can see this narrative on the ground interweaving with how this battle was reported at higher levels. There is one scene where Ludwig leaves his unit to see General Petraeus. It was an amusing scene, and one where Ludwig depicts Petraeus in a highly positive light, unlike how he tends to view those removed from actual combat.

The last part is the aftermath. And Ludwig's goal is not to talk about the war in general, but to continue what he has done and what the aftermath looked like to the individual infantryman. And this meant what happens after they return to the U.S. For those who did not re-enlist, this meant re-entering the civilian economy with all of its difficulties. But this is the part that makes the book different, it starts with the young man who leaves his home to find the challenge of infantry, and ends with him returning after serving his nation in combat, and struggling to reintegrate himself after his nation has prepared him to face challenges under stress, but it itself is a society that does not value that.

I would put his as one of the books that should be read. Maybe even up there with Caputo A Rumor of War or The Things They Carried because of its completeness, for starting with the formation of a soldier to the return of that soldier to a not always remembering nation. And maybe we can remember what we have created with our Army. Men who are disciplined and focused to meet any challenge and mission under stress, but out of place in a society that works so hard to remove challenge and stress from life.

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Book Review: Baghdad at Sunrise by Peter Mansoor

Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq by Peter R. Mansoor

My rating: 5 of 5 stars


This is the memoir of a field-grade officer's tour in Iraq as a Armored brigade commander in 2006. It covers a period where U.S. military doctrine was being debated and changed from active denial that the U.S. was facing an insurgency to fully engaged in counter-insurgency. In particular, as a brigade commander Mansoor was exposed to both decisions from higher up as well as the reality on the ground.

Mansoor demonstrates the capabilities of those in the military. As some recognize (esp. Col Gian Gentile USA), as a practical matter, many in the U.S. military were very aware of tenets of low-intensity warfare from experience in the Balkans, Africa, northern Iraq and around SW Asia and SE Asia. And regardless of what their political masters may say, many have learned that these have to be dealt with, and the U.S. has experience and doctrine to do so, if it is followed.

So the book becomes a memoir of what he faced, how he dealt with the Iraqi people he was there to protect as well as the insurgency he was fighting. And how he handled both as well as the political and military senior leadership of the time (who did not have on-the-ground experience in these same areas). I found it to be candid, and worth reading the thoughts of those who attempted to carry out their countries missions in the unknown of war.



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Movie Review: The Hurt Locker (2009)

The Hurt Locker is set soon after the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and follows a 3-man Explosives Ordinance Disposal (EOD) team: Sergeant James, Sergeant Sanborn and Specialist Eldridge. Sergeant James joins the team near the end of a one-year tour of duty, following the death of Sergeant Thompson. As the senior in rank, James is the team leader. He is also the EOD Tech (i.e. the one who handles the explosive device). Sanborn is Ranger qualified and acts as a mentor to Eldridge. Eldridge is the young one, fighting his fear of dying in combat.

James has two things against him as a leader. First, he is a replacement team leader close to the end of a tour of duty. i.e. these are short timers counting the days until the end of the tour. Second, he is very aggressive, choosing to tackle difficult problems directly instead of conservatively. And this is the defining conflict of the movie.

A lot of things about the setting are very well done. The overall competence of American forces, especially American NCOs, was on full display. The difficulties in working in insurgent environments where it was hard to tell who was on which side. The desire to help the Iraqi's against the desire to take the safe way out. The tension of going into an environment where nothing is secure and everything is fluid and can easily turn deadly without warning. They even showed the tension within the Army between those who viewed their role as security and combat versus those who viewed victory as something that would only be gained by connecting with the population (in the early days, the political leadership was decidedly on the security/combat only view.)

But in the interest of setting up the story, there are many things that are unreasonable. An EOD team was a highly valuable asset, and would not have been risked travelling without an escort. They would not have been employed as light infantry (something alluded to at one point). A Colonel, (especially one that is not combat arms) would not have been allowed to be outside secure areas without escort (but at least they had the sense to tease him in film about his acknowledged incompetence in potential combat roles). And an EOD tech whose job it was to concentrate intently on a single narrow thing (the explosive device) would not be a team leader with the responsibility for an entire team. The parts taken from disarmed explosives would have been taken for investigation and study, not allowed to be hiding underneath some soldier's bed.

But all is forgiven with how well the conflict between James and Sanborn is done. Every scene becomes a way to address this tension in another way. James aggressiveness versus Sanborn's conservationism (of the "I am a soldier who intends to use my experience to complete my mission and live" variety, not the political variety). James single focus on the technical task and challenge of disarming explosives versus Sanborn's view of situations as a whole. And with all that, the fact that James is in fact the team leader, even if Sanborn is tactically more competent (note that Sanborn is Ranger qualified, something that is made explicit when he fills the role of sniper in one scene.)

One thing that the director and writer find hard to get is motivation. The feel of the environment seems pretty good, showing the confusion and lack of clarity in what can be seen. The characters seem reasonable (the writer spent time with a team, and claims the characters are composites. Even if he put character qualities that should not be in a single person together). But we don't quite get the motivations of the characters. Leaders do not get the luxury of focusing on one technical detail while they ignore their men (the Specialist track is for this group). People who are highly trained in very technical skills e.g. EOD techs) do not tend to turn into cowboys. And a Specialist (which usually implies a few years of experience) near the end of a year long combat tour does not get congratulated for not becoming frozen in a combat situation.

Even so, with what they did get right, it is probably one of the better movies on the current wars (see my other reviews). And the depiction of conflict between James and Sanborn makes it a good film.

Book Review: The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army by David Cloud and Greg Jaffe

The Fourth Star: Four Generals and the Epic Struggle for the Future of the United States Army by Greg Jaffe

My rating: 4 of 5 stars
This book follows four Generals who have had various levels of command responsibility during the U.S. war and occupation of Iraq from 2003 and on. John Abizaid, Commander CENTCOM from 2003 - 2007. George Casey, Commander MNF-Iraq in 2004-2007 and current Chief of Staff of the Army, Peter Chiarelli, Commander MNC-Iraq (under Casey), and David Patraeus, Commander MNF-Iraq 2007-2009 and current Commander CENTCOM. These were the commanders who took over the occupation of Iraq after Tommy Franks and Ricardo Sanchez. Of importance for this book, these were also officers that recognized that Iraq was not a conventional war and what the U.S. faced in Iraq was an insurgency, one that the military and its political leaders were ill-equipped to fight from an attitude, doctrinal and training standpoint.

The first part of the book was about their training. Abizaid, Chiarelli and Patraeus were all given assignments and training experiences that encouraged them to be thinkers as well as soldiers. Abizaid having spent a few years on a college fellowship in Jordan, Chiarelli and Patraeus both spent time on academic assignments, with graduate school followed by teaching stints at West Point in the Department of Social Sciences, which the book depicts as a wellspring of unconventional ideas, which trained those who spent a tour as instructors in the willingness to question what who the Army prepared for and fought its wars. The book returns to this theme of Sosh as the place where officers were taught to think, which served them well in learning a new kind of war.

The book makes it clear that those that came before them, Franks and Sanchez were completely out of their element. And while Abizaid, Casey and Chiarelli began to understand that things were wrong and had ideas of what needed to be done, they were hampered by and Army that did not want to change, and a political leadership that was more interested in managing U.S. involvement then they were interested in winning in Iraq. And this interest in merely managing gave a growing insurgency (which was being willfully ignored by the U.S. political leadership) room to blossom, and cause the large scale casualties over 2004-2006.

The star of the book is David Petraeus (with Odierno as his understudy). With the exception of his assignment into the hinterland of the Combined Arms Center, which would have been better then the career ending assignment that was another option. But still a disappointment after the lauded 101st Airborne which was one of the brightest spots in the immediate post-invasion occupation of Iraq. The book paints Petraeus as a hard driving genius who was a stickler for detail and drove his people hard. It was evident in his field level commands detailed in the book, and his first combat command as Commander 101st Airborne in the invasion of Iraq and the occupation of Mosul. And his return to the combat zone as Commander MNF-Iraq after rewriting the new Army Counterinsurgency doctrine had the feel of the rescuing hero, taking over from the exhausted Casey and Chiarelli who had to fight off their political supervisors in Washington as much as the insurgency.

How does it fare? Many of the current conventional wisdom does not credit Abizaid, Casey and Chiarelli since they presided over the worst period of the Iraq occupation, even if the seeds were planted before their arrival and they were hamstrung by a civilian leadership that was in denial of the reality of the situation and was more interested in perception then fact. The book notes what they recognized and tried to create, an Army that recognized that it's goal was to win the population, not necessarily just build up a body count. But they were not able, and that failure hung over them. And the lauding of Petraeus may not be misplaced. I remember a Command Sergeant Major preparing me and some other civilian analysts for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan describing Petraeus as a 'warrior-poet', and this was before Petraeus took his position as Commander MNF-I.

The driving point of the book is the requirement for a military to be flexible in thought and adaptable in the face of an enemy. It is a lesson that is learned with every new war. A peacetime military rewards conformity to standard. An actual war against an adaptable enemy requires leaders who can themselves adapt. The book identifies Charielli and Petraeus as officers of this type. And it also identifies them as generals who are actively raising and promoting the careers of other officers of this mode, in many cases against the desires of some of the institutional army. It means creating room for inventiveness and dissent, which is not always the easiest thing in an institution that is necessarily conservative like the Army. But, even if the heady responsibilty of the life of its soldiers requires some level of conservativism, it also requires innovation in the face of an innovative opponent. The book makes the argument that the Army needs these officers and leaders. And more importantly, it needs institutions that will provide these officers and leaders room to grow, and the ability to question and provide dissent in safety, so that the Army can benefit from them.

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In memoriam: Andrew Olmsted

I saw this some time ago over at The Sandbox (AKA the Doonesbury military blog) Maj Olmsted was killed January 3 in Iraq. And these are his words . . .

Final Post

"I am leaving this message for you because it appears I must leave sooner than I intended. I would have preferred to say this in person, but since I cannot, let me say it here."
G'Kar, Babylon 5

"Only the dead have seen the end of war."
Plato*

This is an entry I would have preferred not to have published, but there are limits to what we can control in life, and apparently I have passed one of those limits. And so, like G'Kar, I must say here what I would much prefer to say in person. I want to thank hilzoy for putting it up for me. It's not easy asking anyone to do something for you in the event of your death, and it is a testament to her quality that she didn't hesitate to accept the charge. As with many bloggers, I have a disgustingly large ego, and so I just couldn't bear the thought of not being able to have the last word if the need arose. Perhaps I take that further than most, I don't know. I hope so. It's frightening to think there are many people as neurotic as I am in the world. In any case, since I won't get another chance to say what I think, I wanted to take advantage of this opportunity. Such as it is.

. . .

The rest is here.

Book Review: Fiasco - The American Military Adventure in Iraq by Thomas Ricks

[ISBN 0143038915]

Fiasco takes a look at the run up to the American invasion of Iraq and the first years of the American occupation attempting to follow the thought and decision making processes of senior American political and military leaders. In the same vein of Bob Woodward's Plan Of Attack, Ricks is trying to paint a picture of how the American political and military establishments works (or does not). His picture is an ugly one, of a political establishment that is disfunctional in its ability to process information and tolerate dissent. His picture of the military is mixed, it is of a military that has a range of those who were inflexible, and those who were trying to learn how to fight a different kind of war, in a political environment that was resistant to learning.

One area that Ricks differs greatly from Woodward is in providing context. Both report on the words and explanations the principle participants used at various times to understand what information was available and the state of mind they received this information in. Ricks goes one step further and gives contextual information. The result is a damning indictment of the political establishment c. 2001-2005 in its misrepresentation of the information available and its protestations that the events were not expected and could not be handled better. His treatment of military leaders was mixed. He describes and Army that was fighting with the political establishment about the nature of war with mixed results. He shows some whose styles were utterly unsuited for this war amongst the people with its ambiguities (like Sanchez or Franks), and other who got it from the beginning (like Patraus and company) and others who learned along the way (like Odierno).

While Woodward seemed very conscious of telling "the first draft of history" and avoiding interpretation, and Atkinson in "In the company of soldiers" was telling a story, Ricks is writing a history, not letting the principles tell the story, but surrounding their words and actions with the context those words and actions appeared in. It provides many lessons in how decisions are made, arguments are won or lost, and the hazards of a political system resistant to dissent.

In the Company of Soldiers by Rick Atkinson

Rick Atkinson is a historian, who sometimes works for the Washington Post. He took a break from writing his WWII trilogy to be embedded with the U.S. 101 Airborne Division with then Major General Petraeus during the U.S. led invasion of Iraq during 2003.

It is an engrossing picture of a military commander in the midst of a war. The emphasis on logistics (his subordinate commands have to deal with tactics). All the little things that need to be ready. The things that an army prepares out of practicality, even when the political leadership says something completely different (e.g. grappling hooks, battering rams and ladders for urban fighting, when the political and military leadership tells all the U.S. Army does not fight in cities).

When the actual fighting starts, you soon realize that the shooting is elsewhere while the commanders are dealing with other aspects of reality. The maintenance of equipment. The changing and unexpected tactics of the opponents (there is a precious vignette that surrounds General Wallace's quote "this is not the enemy that we wargamed against", and the many generals who said they needed many more troops to do the job right. Both were severely chastized by the political leadership. Both were viewed by those with experience in war as being straightforward and open.) Having to deal with details great and small, unexpected events, the plans of the enemy, and the pressures of a national leadership that may or may not be aware of reality.

It is easy to forget that the senior leadership in war are men themselves. The myriad of details is something impossible to comprehend, and the genius of those who can put it all in their heads, even with the assistance of an able staff, is intimidating to behold. "In the Company of Soldiers" does this well. Not a beatification, but a portrait of a man and an army at war.

Beauchamp and the Rule of Second Chances: Pass it Along

At Michael Yon

A few months ago a soldier wrote an article for The New Republic about his ongoing experiences as a soldier in Iraq. He wrote about the activities of his unit. And it was full of stories of how sadistic, cruel, uncaring they had become while deployed to war in Iraq. And for those soldiers who did not become sadistic, how apathetic they became to the violence and depravity around them. Almost like a Hollywood movie about Vietnam with all the expected stereotypes and more. And, as it turned out, completely untrue. Essentially, this soldier wrote the story, and as the editors understanding of war essentially came from Hollywood movies about the Vietnam war, the fact checking was rather spurious.

Now, as the article came out in a prominent forum, the real fact checking began. And in addition to the fact that the stories were false, one other fact that came out was the writer's name. And his unit.

So now we have a problem. Here is a soldier in a combat zone. And he has written an article in a major national magazine that depicts his fellow soldiers as a group of depraved psychopaths. Back in the states, there are individuals writing on internet message boards that he should be punished. Severely. The wolves were calling out for blood. And he is surrounded by the people whom he dragged through the mud. And they all have guns. And they regularly see combat.

So, his company commander gives him a choice. Does he want to transfer. And his commander tells him something else. He is welcome to stay. And he did so.

No doubt there was some awkwardness there. A soldier having to face people whom he had publicly painted as cruel dimwits, when none of the events he described. And it probably was not a pretty thing, of going to battle with people whose relationship is, well, not the best. But there are other realities here. And part of this is the nature of war.

As a society, we (Americans) are generally not a forgiving bunch. Our churches, which like to use words like 'grace' and 'reconciliation' feel free to throw people away (at least the churches I've been to) and forget them as if they did not exist. Our polity is one where perceptions replace truth. And many things are unforgivable. Where disputes are solved by demonizing.

But when life and death is at stake, there is another principle. You have to be able to trust that the person next to you will sacrifice on your behalf. Because you depend on them for your life. And you realize that person, just by being there, also depends on you for theirs. And there are many other things like this, even in non-lethal environments. The fact that there is a common goal overcomes mistakes.

Part of the way we have changes is the separation of our lives from reality. As a society, we have valued a buffer between ourselves and the world, and attempted to insulate ourselves from the pain, hurt, suffering. And along the way sacrifice, trust, and caring for one another have gone as well. There is a saying "no good deed goes unpunished." and a reality that those who would consider helping others, are told that to save a life, is to put your future at risk, and that it is better to turn away from the one in danger, and leave them to their own devices.

With this soldier, for all he has done wrong, there is an understanding that he is there. He still goes out into harms way, alongside others that he is trusting his life with. And they are trusting their lives with him. There may be no way to "pay" for his mistakes. But he is still a comrade in arms. And a very different reaction then "pulling out the hanging rope" for every mistake. It is a different attitude. One of the things observed with the number of soldiers who are coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan, there is now a large pool of people who are Heinlein's human being.

A human being should be able to change a diaper, plan an invasion, butcher a hog, conn a ship, design a building, write a sonnet, balance accounts, build a wall, set a bone, comfort the dying, take orders, give orders, cooperate, act alone, solve equations, analyze a new problem, pitch manure, program a computer, cook a tasty meal, fight efficiently, die gallantly. Specialization is for insects.

So the question, are these enough people who can change a society by their presence? People who are not as self-absorbed, self-righteous, insulating themselves from their environment and others in their faux self-reliance that American society has become. Or will these returning soldiers become examples of people who remember what it is like to stand alongside people from all walks of life, and to depend on one another to succeed and survive.